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BANKRUPTCY REFORM AND THE 
“SWEAT BOX” OF CREDIT CARD 
DEBT 
Ronald J. Mann* 
Those that backed the 2005 bankruptcy reform law argued that it 
would protect creditors from consumer abuse and lack of financial 
responsibility.  The substantial increase in the number of bankrupt-
cies over the last decade combined with the perception of systemwide 
abuse apparently convinced legislators from both political parties that 
the backers had a point.  Thus, Congress enacted amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code that—if effective—would fundamentally change the 
core policies underlying the consumer bankruptcy system in this 
country.  The rhetoric surrounding the reform debates pressed the 
idea that if borrowers had to repay more of their debts, creditors 
would achieve savings that—through pressures of competition—
would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower interest rates 
and improved access to credit.  This essay addresses some of the 
problems with this justification and considers what else creditors (and 
particularly credit card issuers) could have expected to achieve with 
the new law. 
Professor Mann argues that the new law will benefit issuers sub-
stantially, though not for reasons commonly discussed in the negotia-
tion and drafting of the statute.  Means testing alone will not return 
enough in increased bankruptcy payouts to justify the lobbying ex-
penditures and campaign contributions that led to the statute’s enact-
ment.  Rather, the most important effect will be to facilitate the credit 
card lending business model, by slowing the time of inevitable filings 
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for Law, Business & Economics, University of Texas School of Law.  As always, my first debt is to 
Allison Mann for insight and inspiration of all kinds.  In addition to the participants at the conference, 
I thank Peter Burns, Mechele Dickerson, Mark Furletti, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Westbrook, and Wil-
liam Widen for comments, Judge Leif Clark for advice about postreform bankruptcy litigation, and 
Audrey Hare for careful research assistance.  I benefited from discussion of early versions of this work 
at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Bankruptcy Section of the State Bar of Texas, the Risk Managers 
Roundtable, and at the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  I thank 
Charles Tabb for inviting me to participate in this conference and acknowledge the continuing gener-
ous support of the Marlow Preston Fund at the University of Texas School of Law.  I also gratefully 
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weekly bankruptcy filings. 
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by the deeply distressed and allowing issuers to earn greater revenues 
from those individuals.  In a nutshell, the new law does little for credi-
tors once they reach the courthouse.  Its foremost effect will be to en-
able issuers to profit from debt servicing revenues paid by distressed 
borrowers who are not yet in bankruptcy.  For issuers that depend on 
debt revenues, the benefits of the law could be dramatic. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After extensive lobbying by banks and credit card companies,1 Con-
gress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (BAPCPA) on April 14, 2005.2  The Act radically altered the 
policies underlying consumer bankruptcy in this country, marking a sig-
nificant shift in favor of creditors.  This shift is demonstrated most clearly 
by the tremendous surge in filings in the days before the Act became ef-
fective.3 
The core features of the consumer provisions4 were debated at 
length during the eight-year period since the bill drafted by the credit in-
dustry was first introduced.5  For the most part, the proponents relied on 
moral arguments—how shameful it is that Americans walk away so easily 
from their debts.6  Proponents spent much less time discussing the eco-
nomics of the consumer credit industry or the business models of those 
most affected by consumer bankruptcy.7  In particular, the debates often 
focused on the concept of needs-based bankruptcy—or the concern that 
the skyrocketing bankruptcy filing rates indicate that consumers are us-
ing the bankruptcy system for financial planning purposes8 rather than as 
 
 1. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10225 (1998) (remarks of Rep. Nadler) (arguing that the bill was 
written “by and for” credit card companies); 144 CONG. REC. H9146 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Ken-
nedy) (“All year long Congress has been teaming [sic] with credit card lobbyists pushing for legislation 
making it harder for consumers, for working Americans, to get relief from crushing debt woes.”). 
 2. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).  After struggling with 
bankruptcy reform for eight years, Congress passed the Act on April 14, 2005.  President Bush signed 
the Act on April 20, 2005.  Most provisions of the Act became effective on October 17, 2005. 
 3. See Eric Dash, Debtors Throng to Bankruptcy as Clock Ticks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at 
A1 (describing massive lines outside federal courthouses on the final workday before the new law took 
effect).  For graphic illustration, see infra Part IV fig.2. 
 4. The Act has its greatest impact in consumer cases, but affects businesses and farmers as well.  
See BAPCPA tit. IV, 119 Stat. at 104 (“General and Small Business Bankruptcy Provisions”); id. tit. 
X, 119 Stat. at 185 (“Protection of Family Farmers and Family Fishermen”). 
 5. Bankruptcy reform legislation had been under consideration for about eight years, dating 
back to House Bill 2500.  H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997).  BAPCPA and many of its predecessors re-
ceived broad bipartisan majorities in both the House and Senate. 
 6. See Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Ideology and Beyond, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See 144 CONG. REC. S12141 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (“[S]ome people use bank-
ruptcy as a financial planning tool.”); 144 CONG. REC. S10787 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (“The 
fact is that some people use bankruptcy as a convenient financial planning tool to skip out on debts 
they could repay.”); 144 CONG. REC. S10471 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (“Bankruptcy has be-
come a routine financial planning device used to unload inconvenient debts, rather than a last resort 
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a last resort.9  The catch phrase in the legislative history was the “bank-
ruptcy of convenience.”10 
Thus, the new law includes a “means test,” designed to force con-
sumers out of chapter 7 liquidation and into chapter 13, with the inten-
tion of limiting the ability of bankrupts to discharge debts while earning a 
substantial postdischarge income.  The new law also increased the costs 
of filing, not only by raising filing fees,11 but also by lengthening the pe-
riod between permitted filings12 and by imposing administrative hurdles 
related to credit counseling,13 debt relief agencies,14 and attorney certifi-
cations.15  At the same time, the Act substantially limited the relief avail-
able in bankruptcy, with provisions that, for example, broaden the cate-
gories of debts that are not dischargeable.16 
Significant empirical studies of the preexisting law have been used 
to make predictions about the expected impact of the new law.17  Why is 
 
for people who truly need it.”); see also Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Rec-
ommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, in NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, 
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 11 (1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
nbrc/reportcont.html (complaining that bankruptcy becomes “just another tool of financial manage-
ment”). 
 9. E.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10234 (1998) (remarks of Rep. Goodlatte) (“Under the current sys-
tem, some irresponsible people filing for bankruptcy run up their credit card debt immediately prior to 
filing knowing that their debts will soon be wiped away.”); 144 CONG. REC. S10190 (1998) (remarks of 
former Sen. Bentsen) (“With growing frequency, bankruptcy is being treated as a first choice rather 
than a last resort, a matter of convenience rather than necessity.”).  Also see Todd J. Zywicki, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463 (2005): 
[T]he cause of the consumer bankruptcy crisis is not an increase in consumer financial vulnerabil-
ity but rather an increase in consumers’ propensity to respond to financial problems by filing 
bankruptcy and discharging their debts instead of reining in spending or tapping accumulated 
wealth.  The novelty, therefore, is not in the underlying problems but rather the increasing will-
ingness of individuals to use bankruptcy as a response to those underlying problems. 
Id. at 1526. 
 10. E.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10238 (1998) (remarks of Rep. Chabot); 144 CONG. REC. H10224 
(1998) (remarks of Rep. Linder); 144 CONG. REC. S10787 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (“Bank-
ruptcies of convenience are like shoplifting.”); 144 CONG. REC. H4343 (1998) (remarks of Rep. McIn-
nis). 
 11. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 325, 119 Stat. 23, 98–99 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930). 
 12. Id. § 302, 119 Stat. at 75–77 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)); id. § 312, 119 Stat. at 86 (codified 
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328). 
 13. Id. § 106, 119 Stat. at 37–42 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)). 
 14. Id. §§ 227–229, 119 Stat. at 67–72 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 526–528). 
 15. Id. § 102(a)(4)(C), 119 Stat. at 27 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)). 
 16. Id. §§ 310, 314, 119 Stat. at 84, 88 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523).  Those reforms favor credi-
tors.  The most salient “reforms” designed to protect consumers are new disclosure requirements, 
which are likely to be useless or even counterproductive.  See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005) [here-
inafter HOUSE REPORT] (discussing consumer protection goals of the Act).  With respect to minimum 
payment disclosures, the new law requires that credit card companies provide the consumer examples 
of the estimated time for repayment under hypothetical conditions and a toll-free number to call to 
obtain an estimate of the time it would take to repay the actual balance.  BAPCPA § 1301, 119 Stat. at 
204–07 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)) (amending Truth in Lending Act of 1968 § 127, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1637(c) (2000)).  With respect to teaser rates, it requires boilerplate warnings designed to ensure that 
the temporary nature of the rate is disclosed.  BAPCPA § 1303, 119 Stat. at 209–11 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1637(c)) (amending Truth in Lending Act of 1968 § 127, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)).  See generally 
RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD ch. 14 (2006) (criticizing the new disclosures). 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
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the number of bankruptcies rising?  Is it because families are in worse fi-
nancial condition and less able to withstand adverse events?  Is it because 
of an increase in overall consumer debt or credit card debt?  Alterna-
tively, is it because the stigma associated with bankruptcy has decreased?  
Finally, are the abuses episodic or systemic?  Depending on the reason or 
combination of reasons for the filing surge, “means testing” might be a 
credible response if it is likely to increase creditor payouts, lower interest 
rates, or enhance access to credit.18  The focus will shift now to assessing 
the predictions about the impact of the new law, perhaps spawning a sig-
nificant body of empirical scholarship to parallel the important studies 
conducted following the original enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 
1978.19 
My goal here is to focus more narrowly on the new law’s impact on 
the credit card industry.  Some reform proponents argued that it would 
deter reckless borrowing and opportunism.20  Because credit cards are 
the primary vehicle for discretionary spending and borrowing in our 
economy,21 credit card issuers have a greater stake than other lenders in 
public policy related to profligacy.  Therefore, the question is what the 
credit card company lobbyists actually were trying to achieve: To deter 
 
 18. In a statement commending Congress for passing the bill, President Bush explained: “These 
commonsense reforms will make the system stronger and better so that more Americans—especially 
lower-income Americans—have greater access to credit.”  Press Release, President George W. Bush, 
President Commends Congress for Passing Bankruptcy Reform Bill (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050414-5.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006); see also HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 16, at 4 (describing significant losses associated with bankruptcy filings and assert-
ing the existence of a “bankruptcy tax”). 
 19. Any analysis that purports to estimate the effects of any particular bankruptcy reform on 
filing rates must be met with at least some degree of skepticism.  The point is underscored by the con-
flicting empirical assessments of the effects of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.  Com-
pare, e.g., Lawrence Shepherd, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & 
ECON. 419, 435–37 (1984) (finding a significant effect), with Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. 
Weiss, The Increased Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8–11 
(1993) (finding no significant effect).  From my perspective, it would be surprising if we could find 
strong quantitative links between reform measures and filing rates, because so many external factors 
are likely to influence filing rates.  One such example is the concurrent change to minimum payment 
requirements—a change that issuers expect to increase bankruptcy filing rates substantially.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 61–69 (discussing those changes and their effects).  Only the most fundamen-
tal differences are likely to generate statistically cognizable differences in filing rates.  See MANN, su-
pra note 16, ch. 5 (concluding, based on comparative bankruptcy filing data, that filing rates in the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada are significantly lower than they are in the United States).  
Thus, to understand the effects of BAPCPA on U.S. filings, studies that focus on the composition of 
filers are likely to be more useful.  Those studies, however, will not be available for years to come. 
 20. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 (“[T]he present bankruptcy system has loopholes 
and incentives that allow and—sometimes—even encourage opportunistic personal filings and 
abuse.”). 
 21. As of February 2006, credit cards were responsible for about $800 billion in outstanding 
debt, which represented about 37% of the total amount of nonmortgage consumer credit outstanding.  
Fed. Reserve Bd., Statistical Release-Consumer Credit G.19 (Apr. 7, 2006), available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20060407/g19.pdf. 
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risky borrowing ex ante?22  To increase bankruptcy payouts ex post?23  
To lower bankruptcy filing rates? 
My thesis is that the Act well may have none of those effects, and is 
very unlikely to have either of the first two.  Although it is possible that 
the Act will have a marginal effect on long-run filing rates (a topic ad-
dressed in Part IV), it is unlikely that the principal features of the Act 
will have any substantial effect on the borrowing decisions of consum-
ers.24  My focus here is on a more interesting possibility: that the Act will 
increase the bankruptcy payout, helping issuers to recover the losses re-
flected in the urban legend of a $400 per family “bankruptcy tax” that is 
a fixture in the Act’s legislative history.25  Thus, I argue that empirical 
studies of the finances of bankruptcy filers show that credit card issuers 
could not have expected that the new law would return enough in in-
creased bankruptcy payouts to justify the lobbying expenditures and 
campaign contributions that led to its enactment.  Rather, I suggest, the 
most important effect will be to slow the time of inevitable filings by the 
deeply distressed, allowing issuers to earn more revenues from these in-
dividuals before they file.  Hence, because lenders have less incentive to 
limit the costs of financial distress than they did under prior law, the Act 
will encourage them to rely increasingly on business models that depend 
on distressed borrowing. 
My discussion proceeds in three steps.  First, I discuss the standard 
account—what the media and policy discussion leading up to the enact-
ment of the Act suggested about the justifications for the bill.  Second, I 
offer my assessment of what issuers reasonably should have expected 
from the bill.  Finally, looking with hindsight, I try to assess, albeit tenta-
tively, the early data about the reality of the Act’s operations on the is-
sues of most importance to credit card issuers: the total number of filings, 
the share of chapter 13 filings, and payouts to unsecured creditors in 
chapter 13 filings.  On all of these fronts, it is still too early to discern any 
stable gains for credit card issuers. 
II. THE STANDARD ACCOUNT AND ITS PROBLEMS 
A. The Standard Account: Preventing Abuse 
The “means test” has been described as the “heart” of the new 
law.26  The means test essentially makes it harder to get a full discharge 
 
 22. Issuers might have thought that new incentives against reckless borrowing would minimize 
delinquency rates.  If so, issuers could pass the savings to consumers in the form of lower interest rates 
and thus encourage additional borrowing by the financially stable. 
 23. Issuers might have been less concerned about altering the pattern of borrowing ex ante, hop-
ing instead to minimize their losses in bankruptcy through payments pursuant to chapter 13 plans. 
 24. See Ronald J. Mann, Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy, 7 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 395, 427–29 (2006). 
 25. See Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77 (2004). 
 26. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2. 
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of all debts in chapter 7.  Credit card issuers supported means testing be-
cause it forces more high-income borrowers into chapter 13, where those 
borrowers must repay some of their debts.  In a way, means testing sim-
ply marks another step along the path to a changed conception of bank-
ruptcy in this country.  From the traditional view of consumer bank-
ruptcy as a fresh start, where assets are distributed in exchange for a 
discharge, we have moved steadily towards a more modern view of con-
sumer bankruptcy in which repayment is expected to come from income 
that the borrower earns in the years after the bankruptcy filing.27  This 
approach is particularly valuable to card issuers, of course, because their 
customers are much more likely to have income than substantial unen-
cumbered assets. 
The concern with the high-income borrower is not new.  A mecha-
nism to force high-income borrowers into chapter 13 was introduced in 
1984.  Specifically, former § 707 authorized bankruptcy judges to deny 
relief under chapter 7 upon a finding of “substantial abuse.”28  Although 
the cases applying that provision did not adhere to a uniform standard,29 
courts generally held that excess income would be a sufficient factor to 
support such a finding.30  The idea was that it was abusive for a high-
income, low-asset borrower to discharge debts under chapter 7 instead of 
paying off at least a portion of the debts under a chapter 13 plan.31 
The new law creates a presumption of abuse based on a debtor’s in-
come level.32  The formula compares the debtor’s monthly income (the 
average monthly income received during the previous six months) to the 
median income for a household of the same size in the state in which the 
debtor resides.  If the debtor’s monthly income exceeds the state median, 
a presumption of abuse arises.  The means test then allows a debtor to 
subtract standardized amounts for permitted expenditures.33  If the re-
 
 27. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 150–53 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing that change in philosophy). 
 28. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 312, 98 
Stat. 333, 335 (1984) (amended 2005).  For discussion, see WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27, at 
150–52. 
 29. See, e.g., David B. Harrison, Bankruptcy: When Does Filing of Chapter 7 Petition Constitute 
“Substantial Abuse” Authorizing Dismissal of Petition Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b), 122 A.L.R. FED. 
141, 157–58 (2005). 
 30. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means 
Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 666 (2005); Harrison, supra note 29; Eugene 
Wedoff, Means Testing in the New 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 235 (2005). 
 31. For discussion, see WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27, at 152–58. 
 32. For a detailed discussion from the perspective of an experienced judge, see Wedoff, supra 
note 30, at 231–32.  For a summary textbook discussion, see WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27, 
at 158–65. 
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2000); see Culhane & White, supra note 30, at 671–77 (describing the 
means test of § 707). 
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maining funds permit a substantial repayment to creditors over a five-
year period, the court must presume abuse.34 
To understand this provision, it is important to see that the old 
§ 707 did not prevent a judge from finding abuse in every case in which 
the new § 707 creates a presumption of abuse.  The problem from the 
card issuers’ perspective was that bankruptcy judges applying the old 
§ 707 did not often find abuse.  Thus, the statute reflects Congress’s at-
tempt to cabin the discretion that judges were exercising with undue le-
nience.  As Professors Warren and Westbrook explain, the old § 707 left 
“what constituted abuse in a particular circumstance to the judge who 
weighed all the facts and circumstances of the individual case,” whereas 
the new provision “is semi-automated, employing a fixed formula to de-
termine which debtors should be deemed ineligible.”35  Indeed, the legis-
lative history refers to this specific point, emphasizing “the absence of ef-
fective oversight to eliminate abuse in the system.”36 
B. Problems with the Standard Account 
The foremost question about the standard account is whether 
means testing will in fact produce increased returns for creditors.  Anec-
dotal tales of abusive debtors are not the kind of evidence on which a 
sensible policymaker would rely heavily.  Nor can we draw much from 
studies done after passage of the Act.  For example, it is no surprise that 
a very high number of people covered by the provisions filed for bank-
ruptcy shortly before the Act went into effect,37 nor that few people cov-
ered by the provisions filed shortly thereafter.38 
The best approach to understanding the Act would be to look at the 
case files of those who filed for bankruptcy in the years shortly before 
enactment.  Given the rapid changes in the demographic and financial 
condition of bankruptcy filers, studies that sample older files will give 
less valuable information about the effect that the Act will have.  Starting 
with the study that uses the most recent sample, consider the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project, which has a great deal of information about the fi-
nancial position of the typical American bankruptcy filer, and certainly 
 
 34. BAPCPA also amends § 707(a) so that it is enough to find “abuse”; there is no longer a need 
to find “substantial abuse.”  BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a)(2)(B)(i)(III), 119 Stat. 23, 27 (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. § 707). 
 35. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27, at 158. 
 36. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2. 
 37. Culhane and White report a study of 11,000 bankruptcies filed during the summer of 2005, 
shortly before the statute went into effect, indicating that about 15% of the filers had income at or 
above the applicable median.  Culhane & White, supra note 30, at 675 n.48. 
 38. For some early post-Act data, see NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATT’YS, 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM’S IMPACT: WHERE ARE ALL THE “DEADBEATS”? (2006), http://nacba.com/ 
news/022206NACBAbankruptcyreformstudy.pdf [hereinafter NACBA STUDY] (3.3% of approxi-
mately 60,000 early post-Act filers were affected by the means test). 
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has the most substantial study of relatively recent pre-Act filers.39  The 
data from that project suggest that about 8% of consumers filing in 2001 
had incomes above the applicable median.  Even among that subset, 
many had unusually high expenses that would leave them eligible for 
chapter 7 even under the Act.  So a reasonable estimate from that study 
would be that about 5% of pre-Act chapter 7 filers could have been 
forced into chapter 13 by the Act.40 
Looking to the studies that sample older files, an Ernst & Young 
study of 1997 filers concluded that about 10% of the filers would be cov-
ered.41  Conversely, Culhane & White’s project on 1995 filers suggested 
that 3–4% of filers would have been blocked from chapter 7 under a 
slightly different test than the one that passed.42 
Moreover, the ease of planning to avoid those provisions suggests 
that no reasonable person would have expected the provisions to gener-
ate a substantial return.43  For example, Michelle White’s piece in this 
symposium offers a straightforward example of means-test planning, sug-
gesting that fairly simple planning would eliminate a means-test obliga-
tion for debtors with less than $135,000 in annual income.44 
Indeed, when I have discussed my puzzlement about the means test 
with executives at credit card issuers, I have heard to my surprise that 
 
 39. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND 
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989); TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: 
AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME 
TRAP (2003). 
 40. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 27, at 161. 
 41. It is difficult to evaluate the data in the Ernst & Young study, which is not published or 
widely available, but it is discussed in detail in a report prepared by Ken Kowaleski at the Congres-
sional Budget Office.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: A LITERATURE 
REVIEW (2000), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/24xx/doc2421/Bankruptcy.pdf; see also U.S. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: ANALYSIS OF FOUR REPORTS ON CHAPTER 7 
DEBTOR’S ABILITY TO PAY 15 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99103.pdf (dis-
cussing differences between two Ernst & Young studies).  Though the 1998 Ernst & Young report es-
timated that 15% of filers would be covered, this study evaluated a previous bill that included a more 
aggressive means-testing provision.  A 1999 Ernst & Young report estimating 10% coverage, however, 
evaluated provisions of a later bill that closely resembled BAPCPA. 
 42. See Culhane & White, supra note 30, at 665 (suggesting 5% as a high estimate); Marianne B. 
Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-
Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999) (empirical analysis suggesting 
3.6% of debtors could pay something under a provision more generous than the provision in the Act). 
 43. When I attempted a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the investment that the issuers made 
in the statute, it suggested to me that it was quite difficult to believe that the means test would produce 
increased payouts sufficient to generate a good return on the lobbying dollars invested in the Act.  To 
see this point, I assume that issuers would hope to obtain, at a minimum, a $10 million per year payout 
on the investment of approximately $100 million in a decade’s worth of lobbying expenditures for the 
Act.  If there were about 1.35 million bankruptcy filings the year before the Act, and only 10% were 
affected by the Act, those 135,000 files would have to generate $75/year/file in revenue for card issu-
ers.  If the actual payouts on chapter 13 plans were about 25% of promised payouts, the plans would 
need to promise about $300/year/file to unsecured creditors to generate the appropriate level of reve-
nue.  That seemed to me an exceedingly ambitious expectation. 
 44. Michelle J. White, Abuse or Protection? Economics of Bankruptcy Reform Under BAPCPA, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 275; see also William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions 
of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143, 156–58 (discussing nascent means-test planning strategies). 
MANN.DOC 12/15/2006  4:03:45 PM 
No. 1] THE “SWEAT BOX” OF CREDIT CARD DEBT 383 
they do not expect that the means test will produce any substantial reve-
nues for them.  When asked why they supported the provision so strenu-
ously, they explain that the means test as enacted is not at all the provi-
sion for which they lobbied.  The problem, from their perspective, is that 
Congress progressively weakened the means test during the decade-long 
period of the Act’s consideration. 
TABLE 1 
CHRONOLOGY OF THE MEANS TEST 
Year Bill Congress Changes 
1997 H.R. 2500 105th - 
1998 H.R. 3150 (as 
passed by the 
House) 
105th  Income floor changed 
from 75% of median to 
100% of median 
1998 H.R. Rep. 105-794 (Conf. 
Rep. passed by 
the House) 
105th 20% repayment floor be-
comes lesser of 25% or 
$5,000 
1999 H.R. 833 (as passed by the 
House) 
106th  Major changes include ad-
ditional deductions for es-
timated administrative ex-
penses, attorney’s fees, 
tuition, food and clothing; 
repayment floor raised to 
6K 
2000 S. 3186 
(pocket ve-
toed) 
106th Major changes include 
raise repayment floor to 
6K-10K window; new de-
ductions for family vio-
lence, dependent care, and 
chapter 13 
2002 H.R. 5745 107th New deduction for housing 
and utilities 
2005 S. 256 (as en-
acted) 
109th New deduction for 
health/disability insurance 
To understand this point, it is useful to look at the history of the 
means test in its various forms.  As table 1 illustrates, the means test went 
through seven substantially different forms over an eight-year period.  In 
each case, the changes made the test’s coverage substantially narrower, 
or made it substantially easier to evade.  Most telling, even in 2005, when 
the bill was on a fast track for adoption, Senator Kennedy—not the clos-
est ally of the Republican leadership—was able to obtain the amendment 
that added a deduction for health and disability insurance.  As Michelle 
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White discusses, this amendment provides one of the largest “loopholes” 
in the means test.45 
In the end, the story of the means test’s legislative history is not one 
of Congress reflexively giving the credit card industry whatever it sought.  
Rather, the story is one of restive legislators, promising that they will 
support the bill when it comes to the floor, but constantly tinkering with 
it in response to conflicting policy arguments, ultimately robbing the bill 
of much of its promised bite.46 
III. THE SWEAT BOX 
If the most prominent feature of the statute is unlikely to generate a 
substantial increase in payouts to card issuers, how can we be sure that 
issuers will profit from the new law?  My answer emphasizes an entirely 
different intersection between the statute and the business model of the 
credit card issuer.  In my view, the most important aspect of the new law 
is not the increased payouts associated with means testing, but the way in 
which the law encourages debtors to defer bankruptcy filings.  To ex-
plain, let me discuss the business models of credit card issuers and then 
explore how the Act interacts with those models at the point of the bank-
ruptcy filing decision. 
A. The Business Model 
Although credit card issuers have different business models, it is 
reasonable to place them along a spectrum from transaction-based to 
debt-based.  Transaction-based issuers (like American Express and Din-
ers Club) try to earn interchange fees that exceed the cost of funds and 
their transaction costs.  Thus, those issuers attempt to maximize the 
number of cardholders that use their cards frequently for high-value pur-
chases.  Debt-based issuers, by contrast, focus on debt servicing reve-
nues.  Thus, they attempt to maximize the number of customers who do 
not repay their account balances in full each month.  That strategy would 
not seem unusual, but for the fact that the most profitable customers are 
sometimes the least likely to ever repay their debts in full. 
For many other types of lenders—a commercial lender like a mort-
gage company, perhaps—the most profitable customers are the ones 
least likely to default.  The lender sells a relatively static product, such as 
a thirty-year fully amortizing mortgage loan for 75% of the value of the 
property, with a price at a more or less fixed level above the cost of 
funds.  That lender profits a small amount on each loan that is repaid in a 
timely manner, and loses substantially on the loans that are not.  The 
model works because the number of loans paid in full in accordance with 
 
 45. See White, supra note 44. 
 46. For a more complete discussion of the conflicting policies, see Dickerson, supra note 6. 
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their terms is perhaps fifty times the number of loans that default.  Com-
petition in that market drives the major lenders to very similar prices.  
Profitability depends on lowering administrative costs, while at the same 
time limiting bad loans through the exercise of judgment about the qual-
ity of potential borrowers.  In sum, the model works best if all borrowers 
retain robust financial health throughout the term of their obligations.47 
The business model of the debt-based credit card is quite different.  
These lenders depend more heavily on automated techniques of data-
mining and information analysis than on skills of subjective case-by-case 
judgment.48  Thus, only the most technologically adept can hope to re-
main profitable in the industry.  This competitive pressure49 has led to a 
rapid increase in concentration in the industry, so that the ten largest is-
suers in the United States now hold about 88% of all credit card debt in 
the country; the top five hold more than 70%.50 
The successful credit card lender profits from the borrowers who 
become financially distressed.  Financially secure customers or “conven-
ience users” do not generate any interest income, late fees, or overlimit 
penalties.  The only source of revenue they provide typically comes from 
annual fees in some instances and interchange revenues.51  These charges 
might be substantial in some cases, but they account for only about 20% 
of industry revenues.52  Thus, for issuers that rely on lending, “conven-
ience users” are useful only because of the possibility that they will ma-
ture into borrowers—as caterpillars mature into butterflies.53 
For the credit card lender, the first hint of sustained profitability 
comes when the cardholder (now borrower) stops regularly paying her 
balance in full each month.54  If we imagine that this is caused by some 
 
 47. For an example outside the credit card market, see Al Lewis, Dawdling Banks Cost Home-
owners, DENVER POST, May 22, 2006, at K1 (discussing a bank that responded to financial distress of 
homeowner by refinancing the mortgage to increase the amount of the principal and thus the monthly 
debt service). 
 48. Credit Scoring: Testimony Before the House Banking and Financial Services Comm. S. 
Comm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 106th Cong. (2000) (prepared statement of 
Peggy Twohig, Assistant Dir. Fin. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2000/09/creditscoring.htm. 
 49. I refer here to the market in which credit card lenders compete for cardholders.  That market 
is distinct from the markets in which card networks compete against each other and in which acquirers 
compete for merchants. 
 50. Top Credit Issuers, NILSON REP., Feb. 2006, at 9, 9.  For what it is worth, the top five issuers 
and their shares are Bank of America (20%), JPMorganChase (19%), Citigroup (15%), American 
Express (10%), and Capital One (7%).  Id. 
 51. Sophisticated issuers like MBNA can profit from those customers if they can collect substan-
tial annual fees and at the same time succeed in earning a substantial amount of interchange revenue 
from each account, which happens only if their customers commonly use their cards. 
 52. Burney Simpson, Bank Card Profitability and Annual Report, CREDIT CARD MGMT., May 
2005, at 27. 
 53. There also is the possibility that their presence in a portfolio can compensate for the higher 
default-rate percentages among the customers more likely to carry large amounts of debt. 
 54. The Federal Reserve’s most recent survey of consumer finances indicates that 46.2% of all 
families now carry a credit card balance—up from 44.4% in 2001.  Consumers are also carrying higher 
balances—with the mean balance growing to $5100 from $4400 in 2001.  The median income is cur-
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adverse event affecting the borrower’s wages or some unusual expendi-
ture that the borrower hopes to amortize against future wages, we might 
analogize the situation to that of a commercial borrower that loses a ma-
jor customer or suffers a drop in earnings because of poor cost controls.  
In the case of the commercial borrower, the adverse events, if material, 
will lower the loan officer’s expectations of profit from the transaction.  
The analogy is not perfect, because the credit card borrower’s problem 
might involve no adverse event, but simply a momentary bout of profli-
gacy or exuberance, motivated perhaps by the hope of an increased in-
come in months to follow.  Still, whatever the basis for the decision to 
carry a balance, this is not an event of concern.  Rather, it suggests immi-
nent profit for the issuer because the decision to carry a balance leads 
immediately to interest charges on the cardholder’s account, which ac-
crue at a rate far exceeding the lender’s cost of funds.  Moreover, once 
the borrower begins to carry a balance, the likelihood of late and over-
limit fees can increase substantially. 
 
As the spiral increases, the distinction between the two models 
grows starker.  When the first lost customer becomes the failure of an en-
tire product line, the commercial loan will become a problem, probably 
suitable for a “special assets” division with officers particularly skilled at 
minimizing the losses from bad loans.55  As the credit card borrower spi-
rals downward, however, with the monthly balances growing to amounts 
that equal, or even surpass, the borrower’s annual income, the issuer be-
gins to earn large monthly profits on the relationship.  The question for 
 
rently $43,200.  The typical credit card balance is thus now about 10% of the median annual income.  
See Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 
Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2006, at A1, A5 tbl.1, A26–A28 tbl.11, A31.  I 
have been unable to find reliable information on the number of families that make only the minimum 
payment each month. 
 55. For detailed discussion, see Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured 
Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159 (1997). 
MANN.DOC 12/15/2006  4:03:45 PM 
No. 1] THE “SWEAT BOX” OF CREDIT CARD DEBT 387 
the lender is how long the borrower will remain in the unstable position 
before failure occurs. 
If this seems implausible, consider the evidence of the stark in-
creases in chargeoffs related to the recent increases in minimum pay-
ments.  In 2003, American regulators, acting through the Federal Finan-
cial Institutions Examination Council (an interagency group that 
oversees standards for federal examination of financial institutions), is-
sued a “guidance” suggesting that lenders should not permit negative 
amortization and should require repayment in a “reasonable” time.56  
When I first read this guidance, it seemed a trivial policy event because it 
required so little that it seemed targeted primarily to the subprime lend-
ing market.57 
Still, the annual reports of major American card issuers suggest that 
the guidance had an important effect even on mainstream lending prac-
tices.  For example, MBNA reported that it promptly changed its stan-
dard procedure for calculating minimum payments from 2.25% of the 
principal balance to a requirement that each borrower pay 1% of their 
principal in addition to interest and fees.58  Thus, assuming that the inter-
est rate is 24%, the minimum payment on a $5000 balance would in-
crease from $112.50 to $150.59  Take note: this requirement that each bor-
rower repay 1% of the principal each month does not mean that the loan 
will be repaid in 100 months.  A borrower who made the minimum pay-
ments under that plan, and never made any future purchases, would not 
repay the outstanding debt for approximately 27 years, because the 
minimum payment would decline steadily as the outstanding balance de-
clined.60 
Yet even changes of this magnitude will apparently cause major dis-
ruption in the industry.61  The basic problem is that even minimum-
payment increases as slight as those mentioned above are likely to push 
many borrowers past the point of liquidity.  Hard as it may be to believe, 
it appears that a change from a $112.50 to a $150 minimum payment will 
be a change from a difficult payment to an impossible payment for some 
 
 56. Press Release, The Federal Reserve Board, FFIEC Agencies Issue Guidance on Credit Card 
Account Management and Loss Allowance Practices (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030108/. 
 57. For comparison, consider that Britain formerly required cardholders to repay 15% of their 
balance each month.  See MARGARET ACKRILL & LESLIE HANNAH, BARCLAYS: THE BUSINESS OF 
BANKING 1690–1996, at 188–89 (2001); The Plastic-Money Would-Be Pre-Election Boom, ECONOMIST, 
Sept. 9, 1978, at 107 (discussing rule imposed in 1973 and lifted in 1978). 
 58. See MBNA, LIKE NO OTHER ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 33 (2005). 
 59. $112.50 is 2.25% of $5000; $150 is 3% of $5000.  I reached this 3% figure because a 24% in-
terest rate works out to 2% per month, and so the additional 1% brings the total required minimum 
monthly payment to 3%. 
 60. See MBNA, supra note 58, at 33.  The annual report does not indicate that the minimum-
payment has a floor.  The text assumes that there is a minimum payment of $10 per month. 
 61. See, e.g., JPMORGAN CHASE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (“The Firm plans to implement 
higher minimum-payment requirements in the Card Services business in the third quarter of 2005; it is 
anticipated that this will increase delinquency and net charge-off rates . . . .”). 
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borrowers.  Thus, the increased payment minima are expected to in-
crease delinquency and chargeoff rates markedly.  Indeed, industry ana-
lysts expect the effects to be substantial enough to force major changes in 
the fee practices of card issuers.62  The most salient example of this 
change was the 94% decline in MBNA’s profits early in 2005, which 
sources in the industry link to the increase in MBNA’s minimum pay-
ments.63  The fact that such a slight alteration in minimum payment re-
quirements has such a substantial effect on delinquency, chargeoff, and 
bankruptcy rates64 suggests that those lenders are keeping an astonishing 
share of their portfolios balanced on a razor’s edge.65 
After obtaining a successful portfolio, the standard way to increase 
profits is to focus on those customers who are unable to take their busi-
ness elsewhere.  If the customers do not have realistic options, lenders 
are free to raise the interest rates and fees that they charge to those bor-
rowers.66  Ordinarily, a lender that unilaterally raises the fees that it is 
charging its most profitable customers might fear the loss of those cus-
tomers to competitors.  In this particular context, however, the risk that 
competitors will “poach” these profitable customers is relatively slight. 
One problem, discussed by a group of researchers at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in a recent paper, is that the “switching 
costs” are too high.67  An issuer that tries to attract distressed customers 
from a competitor will face an adverse selection problem.68  Recognizing 
that the existing issuer is likely to know more than the new issuer about 
the distressed customer, the new issuer must be concerned that the dis-
tressed customer that it attracts will be so close to failure that the rela-
tionship will be unprofitable.69  The basic idea is that an issuer that tar-
gets the distressed customers will get the worst of them (those that are so 
 
 62. The requirement is expected to reduce the interest income available to issuers, which might 
cause issuers to raise fees.  See Tom Ramstack, Fees Put Squeeze on Credit Cards, WASH. TIMES, July 
4, 2005, at A1 (attributing recent fee increases of U.S. Bank and JPMorgan Chase to increased mini-
mum payment requirement). 
 63. See Martin H. Bosworth, MBNA Profits Plunge, CONSUMER AFF., May 24, 2005, http://www. 
consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/mbna_profits.html. 
 64. It is unfortunate for the empiricist that these minimum payment requirements went into ef-
fect so close to the effective date of BAPCPA, because they will cloud efforts to quantify the effects of 
BAPCPA, just as the effective deregulation of credit card interest rates and the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (invalidating state bans on lawyer advertis-
ing), both of which coincided with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, have hindered efforts 
to quantify how that statute impacted bankruptcy filing rates.  See supra note 19. 
 65. JPMorganChase and CitiBank expect similar problems for their portfolios.  See CitiGroup, 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 29, 65 (2006); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-
K), at 27 (2006); Joe Bel Bruno, Minimum Credit Card Payments Scare Banks, N.J. POST, Mar. 12, 
2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wirestory?id=171661&CMP=OTC-RSSFeedS0312. 
 66. This assumes, of course, that their contracts permit unilateral alterations in response to ad-
verse financial events, which normally is the case. 
 67. Paul S. Calem et al., Switching Costs and Adverse Selection in the Market for Credit Cards: 
New Evidence, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 1653 (2006). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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close to complete failure that they will be unprofitable).70  The best of the 
distressed customers (the ones far enough from complete failure to re-
main profitable) will remain with their existing lender.71  That problem, 
they argue, makes it hard for competing issuers to make strong efforts to 
obtain their business and in turn makes it easier for existing lenders to 
earn more profits from their captive customers.72 
Other practical problems complicate the job of attracting the dis-
tressed customers of another card issuer.  For one thing, the typical way 
of attracting customers from another card issuer is to offer a low “intro-
ductory” rate for balance transfers—often near 0%.  But when the cus-
tomers are already in distress, it might be difficult to profit (even over 
time) from an advance at a very low interest rate.  To be sure, the new 
issuer might be able to profit if it could undercut the existing issuer’s rate 
and still charge a credible rate—beating a 24% or 30% rate with an offer 
of 18%—but as a marketing (or behavioral) matter, I doubt that a cam-
paign targeting customers with a “great new rate of 18%” would be cost 
effective.  The new lender also must confront the problem that it can ob-
tain the customer only if it repays the entire nominal balance of the debt 
owed by the customer.  As discussed below, that amount is likely to sub-
stantially exceed the issuer’s “real” economic investment in the cus-
tomer, and often will significantly exceed any amount that the issuer ex-
pects the borrower to repay.  Collectively, those problems make me 
think that the issuer has quite a firm grip on its customers who have 
fallen into serious distress. 
Another key part of the business model, related to the high switch-
ing costs for distressed borrowers, is the increasing ability of the leading 
issuers to collect substantial revenues in the form of late and overlimit 
fees.  It is commonplace that the average amount of those fees has been 
rising over the last several years.73  What is more interesting, and to the 
point, is that the aggregate amount of those fees, as a share of out-
standing debt, has doubled since 1990, increasing from about 70 basis 
points per year in 1990 to 140 basis points per year in 2004.74 
Referring back to figure 1, this landscape suggests a three-pronged 
business strategy for the credit card lender: (1) limit the share of finan-
cially stable customers (the left part of the curve); (2) maximize the share 
of the portfolio that is at any time in the central (rising) part of the curve; 
and (3) minimize losses from the borrowers who fail. 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Liz P. Weston, Bank Fees Are More Outrageous Than Ever, MSN MONEY, 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/BetterBanking/BankFeesAreMoreOutrageousThanEve
r.aspx. 
 74. I rely here on data kindly provided to me by Mark Furletti at the Payment Cards Center at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
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The first prong (the left part of the curve) suggests that one strategy 
would be to use information technology to segment the market so that an 
issuer focused on lending revenues will have, at any given time, a rela-
tively small share of customers who use the card only for payment trans-
actions.  More importantly, such an issuer hopes to attract the types of 
users who will use the card for borrowing transactions and thus become 
revenue-generating users.  To be sure, some issuers offer products de-
signed to be profitable even in the hands of nonborrowing users.  The 
products might bear annual fees or higher interchange fees.  But even 
here, the goal is to target frequent card users.  Because the marginal in-
terchange revenue from each payment transaction typically exceeds the 
marginal cost of processing and because there is a fixed cost for issuing 
and maintaining each account, high-volume users are more profitable 
than low-volume users.  Hence, the worst customers are those who accept 
cards and use them infrequently.  Conversely, a customer who uses the 
card constantly for multiple transactions each day with a large dollar vol-
ume each month can be reasonably profitable for a lender, even if the 
cardholder pays off her entire balance each month. 
To be sure, if the lender seeking new customers cannot tell which of 
its nonborrowing customers are likely to mature into borrowing custom-
ers, the lender’s strategy might be to acquire as many high-volume cus-
tomers as possible, whether or not they borrow, hoping that the larger 
the portfolio of customers, the greater the number of highly profitable 
borrowing customers the issuer will have in the end.75  But even that 
strategy focuses attention on the middle part of the curve, which clearly 
is where the real profits are made.76 
The third prong (the right part of the curve) simply recognizes that 
issuers face the blood-from-a-stone problem discussed in the previous 
part of this essay.77  Little can be done to increase the recovery from peo-
ple in severe financial distress.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the Act will 
substantially increase recoveries from that portion of the curve.  If most 
bankruptcy filers are in severe financial distress, the obvious solution is 
for lenders to cut their administrative costs and liquidate the debt when 
distress becomes overwhelming.  Although my thoughts on this topic are 
relatively impressionistic, discussions with industry sources suggest that 
 
 75. The profitability of this strategy is undermined by the problem that newer accounts that are 
not “seasoned” are less valuable to the issuer because the cardholder’s behavior is less predictable. 
 76. For a detailed account of portfolio management strategy, from an issuer’s perspective, see 
Managing the Credit Life Cycle, CARD INT’L, Mar. 31, 2006, at 14. 
 77. Although I do not have a definitive source for the risk assessment practices of card issuers, I 
do think it is clear that they are not trying to minimize delinquencies.  For this reason, in a related pa-
per I challenge the assumption that bankruptcy policy should focus solely on the incentives of borrow-
ers to avoid financial distress and bankruptcy.  Instead, I suggest, the proper approach should allocate 
losses between borrowers and lenders in a way that minimizes the net costs of financial distress.  Gen-
erally, I argue that this calls for placing more risks on lenders, so that they will have an incentive to use 
information technology to limit the costs of distress.  Accordingly, I believe that the Act is a move in 
the wrong direction.  See Mann, supra note 24. 
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the major credit card issuers are increasingly moving towards selling de-
faulted credit card debt (at a price of approximately ten to twelve cents 
on the dollar).78  The developing market appears to suggest that the debt 
is more valuable in the hands of the smaller companies that can collect 
more aggressively than reputable large companies.79 
That leaves the second prong, or the central part of the curve.  This 
part of the curve covers the spectrum from those who carry balances, to 
those who routinely make minimum payments, to those who miss pay-
ments altogether.  As the discussion above suggests, the strategy makes 
sense only if the lenders can obtain an adequate return from their bor-
rowers during the period they are in that part of the curve—the “sweat 
box” in my terms.  If this inference seems implausible, notice that the in-
terest rates that borrowers pay while they are in the sweat box greatly 
exceed the cost of the lender’s funds.  Thus, if the borrower resides in the 
sweat box for very long—making substantial interest payments at a high 
rate—the lender with a lower cost of funds in effect receives a return of 
the funds that it has lent each month. 
To quantify this effect, I ran a simple experimental spreadsheet to 
see how hard it would be for a lender to recapture its investment.  In 
general, the experiment80 assumes the following: 
• The lender’s cost of funds is 3%.81 
• The lender charges 18% per month for the first three months 
that the borrower pays the minimum payment, 24% per month 
for the next three months, and 30% per month thereafter. 
• The monthly minimum payments are 2% while the annual inter-
est rate is 18%, 2% + $50 when the annual interest rate is 24%, 
and 2.5% + $50 when the annual interest rate is 30%. 
• The borrower incurs a $40 late or overlimit charge every other 
month starting with the seventh month that she makes the mini-
mum payment. 
Applying those assumptions to a borrower who starts out with a 
balance of $2000 and makes no new purchases, the stated balance at the 
 
 78. See Darren Waggoner, Once Viewed as a ‘Poison,’ Bad-Debt Resales are Booming, CARDS & 
PAYMENTS, Sept. 2005, at 42 (quoting rates of ten to twelve cents on the dollar for “[f]resh chargeoffs” 
and four cents on the dollar for loans being sold for the third time). 
 79. It is difficult to pin down the reasons for this development, but part of it surely has to be that 
reputational constraints would prevent the major credit card issuers from engaging in the kind of col-
lection techniques that are typical of those smaller firms that collect debt for a living.  For a discussion 
of new collection techniques, see Louis Berney, Technology Brings a Kinder, Gentler Process to Col-
lections, CARDS & PAYMENTS, Oct. 2005, at 18.  For graphic interviews, see MAXED OUT (2006) (a 
documentary exploring debt in contemporary America). 
 80. The spreadsheet is available on my Web site, http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/profile. 
php?id=mannrj1. 
 81. This figure is based on the cost of funds for leading credit card issuers in their most current 
annual reports. 
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end of twenty-five months is still $1270 (more than half the original 
loan).  But looking at the “economic” balance—applying the lender’s 
cost of funds to the monthly balance instead of the stated interest rate—
the entire loan has been repaid (with $6 to spare).  A slightly different 
example is arguably more provocative: if we assume that the borrower 
makes a $100 purchase every three months and run the example for 34 
months, we have a stated balance of $2070 (slightly more than the initial 
balance), but in “economic” terms the entire loan has been repaid (with 
$26 to spare).  A final experiment, assuming a more aggressive issuer, as-
sumes that the interest rate is 30%, 36%, and 42%, and that there is a 
$50 late or overlimit fee every month starting in the sixth month; in this 
example the economic balance is repaid in the thirty-second month, 
whereas the total stated balance remains more than $2800.  If we imagine 
borrowers who limp along, carrying those balances for decades—neither 
discharging them in bankruptcy, nor ever paying them off entirely, per-
haps making an occasional minor purchase—we can see how profitable 
this business model can be. 
I note that a recent survey of balance-carrying Americans suggests 
that the median family with a balance has been carrying it for thirty 
months (with an average of forty-three months).82  The examples above 
suggest that this is just about long enough for the lender to recover its in-
vestment, but not nearly long enough for the cardholder to repay its 
debt. 
B. The Effects of the Act 
With that business model in mind, let us turn now to the Act.  Al-
though the Act might have a limited effect on transaction-based credit 
card issuers, I argue that the Act will have a major effect on debt-based 
issuers.  Specifically, the dominant impact of the new law occurs in the 
central part of my curve, as the Act operates to delay the time of filing 
for a considerable group of financially distressed card users.83  If those 
card users continue to make payments until shortly before they surrender 
and file for bankruptcy, the delay in filing—lengthening the time in the 
“sweat box”—will increase the profits the lenders receive from those ac-
counts, or decrease the losses the lenders will face when those customers 
ultimately file for bankruptcy.84 
Put simply, the issuers have persuaded Congress to take the line in 
figure 1 that demarcates the zone of high profitability from the zone of 
 
 82. DEMOS, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET: THE REALITY BEHIND DEBT IN AMERICA 8 (2005). 
 83. Financial distress might seem like a harsh way to describe the predicament of this group.  
After all, many high-income borrowers will be able to mark time in the sweat box almost indefinitely. 
 84. William Widen suggests in comments on a draft of this paper that the delay is especially ad-
vantageous to issuers that securitize their debt receivables because it gives the issuer more time to 
manage the delinquency rate in the portfolio to prevent an early termination of the securitization fi-
nancing. 
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failure, and move it over by several months.  One economic perspective 
on this situation would view the consumer credit industry as a private 
wage insurer, providing emergency funds to households in distress, while 
the bankruptcy system provides consumption insurance, protecting 
against sharp income dropoffs.85  The strengthening of the sweat box ef-
fect restricts the amount of consumption insurance that is provided pub-
licly and thus increases the importance of wage insurance. 
Once the point is made, it is easy to see that several of the Act’s no-
table features are likely to defer the time of filing.  Two distinct strategies 
are apparent: provisions that increase the cost of filing and provisions 
that decrease the benefit of filing.  If we think of the bankruptcy decision 
as a determination of the point in time at which the benefits of bank-
ruptcy are sufficient to overcome the natural aversion to the admission of 
failure that a bankruptcy filing represents, and if we expect that in most 
cases the starkness of financial distress will make the filing inevitable, we 
would expect these provisions to have the effect of delaying the time of 
filings, but not decreasing the aggregate number of them.86 
The most obvious example, of course, is the stark increase in filing 
fees wrought by section 325 of the Act, so that it now costs $299 to initi-
ate a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.87  The fee increase is a valuable 
example of the effect of the statute, because the large fee—going to the 
government not to creditors—directly reduces the recoveries to be ex-
pected for creditors.  The only value it represents to creditors is that it 
can defer—or deter—bankruptcy filings. 
Another simple and effective rule in this category is the extension of 
the period during which the debtor cannot file a new bankruptcy peti-
tion.88  Thus, the well-counseled debtor who chooses to file in response to 
a particularly distressing situation must accept that a bankruptcy filing 
will not be possible in the years to come even if the subsequent situation 
becomes worse than the current one.  This would seem a relatively small 
problem if we were still in a world in which a bankruptcy filing provided 
a substantially fresh start.  But as studies show, a large share of bank-
 
 85. See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 
13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129 (2005); see also White, supra note 44. 
 86. Of course, if we believe that a substantial group of filings are not motivated by overwhelming 
financial distress, then the increase in the net costs of filing might deter some filings altogether.  For 
reasons I have explained elsewhere, I doubt there are a large number of such filings.  See Mann, supra 
note 24. 
 87. This figure was effective April 9, 2006, as calculated by the Administrative Office of United 
States Courts.  See United States Bankruptcy Court Fees, http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/ 
fees.html. 
 88. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 302, 312, 119 Stat. 23, 27–35 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 
727, 1328).  The refiling provisions are particularly interesting for my discussion because they create an 
extended window within which issuers can retain customers in a sweat box without any risk of bank-
ruptcy discharge.  See Timothy Egan, Newly Bankrupt Raking in Piles of Credit Offers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2005, at 1 (discussing practice of lending to the newly bankrupt). 
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rupts continue to experience financial distress that is as bad as—or even 
worse—than the distress they faced before their filing.89 
Another important obstacle is the increased bureaucratic responsi-
bility of attorneys who represent borrowers, which flowed from the gen-
eral congressional condemnation of the bankruptcy bar.90  This was a fa-
vorite theme of Senator Grassley: 
Today, many lawyers who specialize in bankruptcy view bankruptcy 
as an opportunity to make big money for themselves.  This profit 
motive causes bankruptcy lawyers to promote bankruptcy as the 
only option even when a financially troubled client has an obvious 
ability to repay his or her debts.  In other words, this profit motive 
creates a real conflict of interest where bankruptcy lawyers push 
people into bankruptcy who don’t belong there simply because they 
want to make a quick buck. 
. . . . 
Mr. President, I think there is a widespread recognition that 
bankruptcy lawyers are preying on unsophisticated consumers who 
need counseling and help in setting up a budget and who do not 
need to declare bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy lawyers are the fuel which 
makes the engines of the bankruptcy mills run.91 
The best example here probably is § 707(b).  This provision—in the 
style of Sarbanes-Oxley—now requires the debtor’s attorney to certify 
that the lawyer has investigated the accuracy of the borrower’s filing in-
formation.  One could say that this is nothing new, just a restatement of 
Rule 11 in another context.  But provisions like § 707(b)(4)(A)—
specifically requiring the debtor’s attorney to pay the costs and attorney’s 
fees incurred in connection with a successful motion to convert under 
§ 707(b)—make it likely that consumer bankruptcy attorneys will in fact 
spend more resources collecting verifiable evidence of a prefiling investi-
gation than they did under pre-Act law.92  Indeed, some observers view 
much of the Act as laying an elaborate trap for those who make a living 
out of representing consumer bankrupts.93  Regardless whether the 
heightened investigation requirement has other salutary effects, it seems 
likely to increase the cost of a bankruptcy filing.  Those who supported 
 
 89. See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, Going Broke and Staying Broke: The Realities of 
the Fresh Start in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, 92 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
 90. See 144 CONG. REC. S12140 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (“[T]he bankruptcy bar is not 
adequately counseling people as to whether or not they should be in bankruptcy, let alone discourag-
ing them from being in chapter 7 when they should be in chapter 13.”). 
 91. 144 CONG. REC. S10649 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley); see 144 CONG. REC. S10569 
(1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (noting similar criticism).  Perhaps Senator Grassley’s most reveal-
ing comment is the following: “I know of attorneys in Alabama who are running advertisements, who 
are making $1,000 per bankruptcy case and filing 1,000 cases a year.  They are making big bucks off 
this system.”  144 CONG. REC. S10571 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley). 
 92. BAPCA § 102, 119 Stat. at 27–35 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707). 
 93. Catherine E. Vance & Corinne Cooper, Nine Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under 
the New Bankruptcy Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 283 (2005); see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 
(suggesting that “misconduct by attorneys” was one of the principal factors motivating reform). 
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the Act suggested it would increase costs by about $150 to $200 per case, 
and there is little reason to think that they were exaggerating.94 
Another example, typical of the drafting style of the Act, comes 
from the new rules in section 526 concerning debt relief agencies, which 
arguably apply to attorneys.95  If they do, there is a new avenue for attor-
ney liability in connection with assistance provided to consumers.96  Even 
if they do not, those rules clearly will have the effect of limiting access to 
the bankruptcy courts previously provided by non-attorney petition pre-
parers.97 
Although it is too soon to know the impact of those rules—the 
magnitude of the impact probably will shrink over time, as attorneys ad-
just to the new system—they surely will raise filing costs in the short 
term.  As filing costs rise, even the most desperately insolvent must delay 
bankruptcy, at least until they can save the amount necessary for the fil-
ing fee and the attorney’s fee.98 
The new rules about credit counseling interpose another hurdle.  
Codified in Bankruptcy Code § 109, these rules generally require bor-
rowers to seek credit counseling shortly before filing for bankruptcy.99  
Given the urgency with which the financial position of consumers dete-
riorates, and Congress’s effort to close any avenue by which judges might 
forgive noncompliance, these rules can lead to great hardship in particu-
lar cases, as judges already have noted.100  But the major effect, it ap-
 
 94. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 45. 
 95. See In re McCartney, 336 B.R. 588 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (declining to reach issue in case 
in which Office of United States Trustee filed a brief arguing that the provisions apply to attorneys).  
For a detailed argument that the provisions do apply to attorneys, see Jean Braucher, The Challenge to 
the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 93. 
 96. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 522 (statement of Sen. Watt) (“These provisions 
would also have a chilling effect on debtor’s lawyers and their firms by requiring all of their newslet-
ters, seminars, advertising materials to include awkward and misleading statements identifying them-
selves as debt relief agencies.”). 
 97. See In re Barcelo, No. 03-22074, 2005 WL 3007104, at *1–2 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (enjoin-
ing a large bankruptcy petition preparer from most of its previously customary activities). 
 98. It is notoriously difficult to obtain reliable information about how much it costs to file for 
consumer bankruptcy.  See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cul-
tures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 545–47 (1993) (suggesting a typical fee of approximately $1000 based 
on an empirical study of pre-Act fees).  Still, it is hard to believe that fees will not eventually rise under 
the Act.  The judges with whom I have discussed this question suggest that fees have risen substan-
tially (by more than 20%) since the effective date of the Act. 
 99. For critical discussion, see Braucher, supra note 98; Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, Empty 
Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Pre-Petition Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial 
Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 549 (2005). 
 100. The most prominent opinion probably is that of Judge Monroe in In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (characterizing the statute as “inane” and asking if “any rational human be-
ing [can] make a cogent argument that this makes any sense at all”).  See also In re Dixon, 338 B.R. 
383 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of bankruptcy petition for violation of prefiling counsel-
ing requirement).  The most successful loophole to date appears to be the view that the counseling 
obligation is jurisdictional, so that an attempt to file without counseling is ineffective.  The result is 
that the court can dismiss the petition without opening a case that would bring the refiling rules into 
play.  See In re Rios, 336 B.R. 177 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2005); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).  But see In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145 
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pears, will be to make it harder, more time-consuming, and more expen-
sive for consumers to file for bankruptcy.101 
As with the rules discussed above, it is difficult to predict exactly 
how much of a hurdle this will be.  Early indications are that in many 
cases debtors will have access to expeditious credit counseling, often over 
the Internet.102  But part of this hurdle surely is psychological: the hu-
miliation of going through counseling doubtless will slow some cogniza-
ble group of people, for some time, from filing. 
The second strategy is more indirect, but no less effective: to lower 
the benefits of bankruptcy.  It is here that I see the most salient effect of 
the means-testing requirement.  If filing will not provide as much of a 
fresh start as it formerly did, then well-counseled debtors might wait to 
file until they are in deeper distress.  The other obvious example is the 
expansion of the categories of nondischargeable debts.103  Here, for ex-
ample, is one of the rare explicit references in the Act to the “open end 
credit plan” that is the regular product of the credit card issuer.104  Spe-
cifically, post-Act § 523(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II) prevents a discharge of any cash 
advances exceeding $750 during the 70 days preceding bankruptcy.  
Given the frequency with which distressed borrowers might be borrow-
ing on a credit card to repay other pressing obligations, this provision can 
convert garden-variety dischargeable unsecured debt into nondischarge-
able debt that will pass through bankruptcy unaffected. 
The discussion in this section is speculative.  It depends on a variety 
of empirical assumptions about the behavior of distressed borrowers that 
are difficult to verify empirically.  For example, I assume that the bill will 
have only a minor effect on the number of people who choose to file, al-
though it will have a noticeable effect on when they file.105  That assump-
tion makes sense if you believe (as the data indicate) that the over-
whelming majority of filers are in such distress that they are all but 
compelled to file.  As discussed above, there is data to support that as-
sumption, but it certainly is not conclusive.  Similarly, I assume that con-
sumers are making payments right up to the moment that they file, and 
that the statute thus slows down both bankruptcy and the termination of 
revenues for the issuers.  A contrary assumption certainly is plausible: 
the statute might defer the bankruptcy filing weeks or months past the 
 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (rejecting the case/petition distinction); In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2006) (same). 
 101. Nor does it appear that credit counseling will produce any great number of repayment plans, 
given the general level of financial distress of the relevant population.  See Caroline E. Mayer, Bank-
ruptcy Counseling Law Doesn’t Deter Filings, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2006, at A1. 
 102. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2000). 
 103. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 310, 119 Stat. 23, 84 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)); id. 
§ 314, 119 Stat. at 88 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)). 
 104. Id. § 310, 119 Stat. at 84 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(II)). 
 105. For some early evidence in support of that perspective, see NACBA STUDY, supra note 38 
(suggesting that the great majority of filers are in such dire distress that bankruptcy would have been 
inevitable, without regard to changes made by the Act). 
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point of hopeless distress, but payments might stop at the same time as 
they would have before the Act.106  These are, of course, empirical ques-
tions.  I can imagine testing them, but I certainly acknowledge that it 
would be difficult. 
IV. THE REALITY 
Finally, I close with a few early assessments of the post-Act land-
scape, which tend to suggest, in hindsight, that credit card issuers overes-
timated the net profits they would earn from their investment in the Act.  
My discussion here is self-consciously tentative, resting as it does on data 
available in the first few months after the Act went into effect.  I discuss 
three separate questions, in decreasing order of generality: (1) the overall 
filing rate, (2) the share of chapter 13 filings, (3) and the amount paid to 
unsecured creditors in chapter 13 cases. 
A. Filing Rates 
The biggest question concerning the Act is what its long-term effect 
on filing rates will be.  To shed some light on that question, figure 2 
shows the weekly filing rates from January 2004 through the first thirty-
five weeks of 2006 (the end of August). 
Several things about that figure are noteworthy.  First, it displays 
the massive spike in filings in October of 2005, just before the October 17 
effective date of the bill.  Logically, that spike would consist of the “nor-
mal” October 2005 filings, plus two groups of people: early filers and new 
filers.  The early filers are those who eventually would have filed anyway, 
but who chose to file early because of concerns about the onerous provi-
sions of the Act.  The new filers are people who but for the Act would 
never have filed—who would have “toughed it out” without a bank-
ruptcy filing—but chose to file because of concerns that the Act’s proce-
dures would be unduly harsh if they later turned out to need bankruptcy 
relief. 
 
 106. My intuition that the borrowers often pay until close to the bankruptcy date is supported by 
the rising complaints in the 1990s about “trapdoor” debtors.  See Elizabeth Warren, The Changing 
Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 198–99 (1999) (discussing com-
plaints by creditors about “trapdoor” debtors, who file for bankruptcy before they are even delinquent 
on their debts).  As the text suggests, credit card issuers now recognize that it is to their advantage to 
have the trapdoor debtor, rather than the debtors that stop paying months before bankruptcy over-
takes their affairs.  Conversations with issuers suggest that in the present market about 20% of bank-
ruptcy filers are current on their debt at the time of their bankruptcy filing.  Although the issuers with 
whom I had this conversation collectively had only about a 20% market share of American credit card 
debt, they assured me that between them their portfolios surely included the overwhelming majority 
of American bankruptcy filers: each of the two indicated that their portfolio included about 75% of all 
American bankruptcy filers. 
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FIGURE 2 
WEEKLY INDIVIDUAL FILINGS (2004–2006) 
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Source: Author’s Calculations Based on Data from Lundquist Consulting 
My conversations with industry sources suggest that the spike was 
much larger than expected.  Thus, at the time, it was thought that much 
of the spike was comprised of new filings.  But the shape of the curve in 
subsequent months suggests that a large share of the spike, at least, con-
sisted of early filers.  The reason for this conclusion is that ten months 
after the Act became effective, in August 2006, filings were still trending 
steadily upward from the preternaturally low level they reached shortly 
after the Act became effective.  To see this point, consider figure 3, 
which shows weekly filings for the first thirty-five weeks of 2004 and 
2006, as well as a “difference” line, which shows the excess of the 2004 
filings over the 2006 filings.107  As the trend line superimposed over the 
difference line illustrates, the difference has declined steadily during the 
first eight months of 2006. 
Two filing trends connected with the passage of the statute readily 
could explain those trends.  First, the “early filing” effect discussed 
above: a lot of people filed before BAPCPA who otherwise would have 
filed later.  That effect should depress filing rates after BAPCPA until it 
plays out.  Second, the “deferral” effect discussed in Part III: the provi-
sions that make filing more costly, more bureaucratic, and more humili-
ating should defer filings until people are deeper in distress.  That effect 
should depress filings initially but ultimately fade away as well. 
It is too early to assign any specific share to the two effects.  It is 
provocative, however, to see the period over which those effects have 
 
 107. I construct the figure with 2004 rather than 2005 filings because the 2005 filings were affected 
by the adoption of BAPCPA even before it became effective in October 2005. 
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played out.  I would not have expected pre-BAPCPA early filers to have 
filed ten months early.  But if we discard that explanation, we have to 
think that the deferral effect operates over a similarly extended period.  
If so, the steady upward trend in filing rates reflects the period during 
which the deferred filings are slowly rising to their “normal” level.  If we 
have not yet reached that level, BAPCPA is deferring some filings more 
than ten months. 
FIGURE 3 
WEEKS 1–35 INDIVIDUAL FILINGS (2004, 2006) 
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Source: Author’s Calculations Based on Data from Lundquist Consulting 
It is far too soon to be sure of the level at which filings will stabilize 
after BAPCPA.  The data above illustrate graphically that the filing rates 
remain far below the pre-BAPCPA levels.  Yet the steady convergence 
of post-BAPCPA filing levels with pre-BAPCPA filing trends suggests 
that we cannot yet be sure that the decline, if any, will be substantial. 
B. Chapter 13 Filings 
The second important question about the Act’s effect on credit card 
issuers is how it will affect the share of filings made under chapter 13, as 
opposed to chapter 7.  The purpose of the means test, after all, is to force 
borrowers into chapter 13.  But the provisions of the Act that relate to 
chapter 13 provide a strong countervailing influence.  As discussed by 
Bill Whitford and Jean Braucher in their contributions to this sympo-
sium, those provisions remove the incentives for most filers to choose 
chapter 13.108  Thus, it is entirely possible that the Act as a whole will 
have the effect of lowering the rate of chapter 13 filings—a perverse out-
 
 108. Braucher, supra note 95; Whitford, supra note 44. 
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come for credit card issuers used to receiving nothing in chapter 7, but a 
realistic one nonetheless. 
Again, it is far too soon to tell, but the early data are instructive.  
figure 4 shows the percentage of chapter 13 filings (as a share of all bank-
ruptcy filings) for the last two years.  Not surprisingly, the share of chap-
ter 13 filings immediately after the Act is unusually high: the overwhelm-
ing majority of early filers would have been chapter 7 filers (as we can 
see from the October 2005 datapoint).  Those left behind would be chap-
ter 13 filers. 
FIGURE 4 
CHAPTER 13 SHARE OF FILINGS (2004–2006) 
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Source: Lundquist Consulting 
What is interesting about figure 4 is that the chapter 13 rate is still 
falling steadily several months after the Act’s effective date.  Here, the 
data suggest a little more basis for a prediction than they did with respect 
to the overall filing rate.  Although the chapter 13 share of filings has not 
yet fallen below the typical pre-Act share of about 30%, it is important to 
recognize that the higher rate in figure 4 is a share of an unusually low 
overall rate. 
Thus, as figure 5 illustrates, the gross number of chapter 13 filings 
now is much lower than it was before the Act.  That suggests to me the 
likelihood that, as the total number of filings returns to a stable level, the 
share of chapter 13 filings will stabilize at a level below the pre-Act level.  
As with the total filing data, it is too soon to be sure where the filings will 
stabilize, but it does seem clear already that BAPCPA is not going to 
cause a major shift in favor of chapter 13 filings. 
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FIGURE 5 
WEEKLY CHAPTER 13 FILINGS (2004–2006) 
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Source: Lundquist Consulting 
C. Returns in Chapter 13 
The final question is what credit card issuers can expect to receive 
in the chapter 13 plans approved under the Act.  Here, Bill Whitford’s 
piece in this symposium provides a fascinating account of how the hap-
penstance of a Michigan senator’s political weight in the Republican 
Party led to car lenders getting an unusually strong provision for their 
benefit—one more instance of the credit card issuers failing to get the 
statute that they “paid for” back in 1998.109 
The key here is the amendments to Bankruptcy Code § 1325.110  
That oddly written provision appears as a “hanging” unnumbered para-
graph at the end of § 1325(a)—after § 1325(a)(9) but apparently operat-
ing to amend § 1325(a)(5): 
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a 
claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase 
money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the 
claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day period preceding 
the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt 
consists of a motor vehicle. 
Although the new language is so obscurely written that it could be inter-
preted in various ways—perhaps the intention is that there should be no 
allowed secured claims for car lenders111—the most likely intent112 seems 
 
 109. See Whitford, supra note 44. 
 110. See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80–81 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325). 
 111. See In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 336 n.8 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (quoting 8 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY 1325.06[1][a] (15th ed. rev. 2005)); In re Carver, 338 B.R. 521, 526 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
2006); see also Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, 
Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 469–74 (2005) 
(providing a thorough discussion of readings less favorable to car lenders). 
 112. In gauging intent, I note, among other things, that the title of this section of the Act is “Giv-
ing Secured Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13.”  Although courts that, like In re Carver, adopt a 
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to be that the entire amount of the car lender’s claim should be treated as 
an allowed secured claim for purposes of § 1325(a)(5).113  That interpreta-
tion would have the effect of placing car lenders in a position quite simi-
lar to the position home lenders have held since the decision in Nobel-
man v. American Savings Bank.114 
What that means for credit card issuers, in turn, is that there is 
greater pressure in debtor budgets to pay funds to the holders of car 
loans, leaving lower amounts available for unsecured creditors.115  Con-
versations with bankruptcy judges in the early days after the Act suggest 
to me that this particular provision is leaving unsecured creditors (includ-
ing credit card issuers) with no recovery much more frequently than was 
the case in the pre-Act environment.  Scholars herald the arrival of chap-
ter 13 “zero-payment” plans—which pay nothing whatsoever to unse-
cured creditors.116  Thus, there is good reason to think that credit card is-
suers in fact will do worse under post-Act chapter 13 plans than they did 
under pre-Act chapter 13 plans.  Hence, even if the Act does increase the 
share of bankruptcy filings that fall under chapter 13, it is not clear that 
this will produce any increased recovery for card issuers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The credit card is perhaps the most important financial innovation 
of the twentieth century; it introduced substantial efficiencies in both 
payment and borrowing markets.  The credit card, however, is associated 
with increases in spending, borrowing, and financial distress.117  It is not 
clear why that is the case, although academics have suggested it may be 
due to cognitive impairments, compulsive behavior, excessive or unfair 
advertising, or fraudulent contracting practices.118 
Reform-minded governments around the world currently are strug-
gling with how to respond to the problems with credit cards without un-
dermining the efficiency of payment and lending markets.119  Some re-
 
more restrictive reading are correct in noting that earlier versions of the bill would have more plainly 
articulated this intent, I think it is fairer to attribute the final version of the Act to sloppy drafting than 
to a decided intention to treat car lenders worse than all other secured creditors. 
 113. For cases following that reading, see In re Horn, 338 B.R. 110 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006); In re 
Robinson, 338 B.R. 70 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). 
 114. Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
 115. Of course, some of the provisions will elevate the likelihood that credit card lenders will be 
repaid in bankruptcy before other unsecured creditors.  The principal example is BAPCPA § 310, 
which revises Bankruptcy Code § 523 to broaden the types of credit card debt that are presumptively 
not dischargeable.  Among other things, any cash advance of more than $750 will raise that presump-
tion.  So, if a borrower, in the ninety-day period before bankruptcy, obtains a cash advance to pay rent 
or a medical bill or to shift balances from one credit card to another, the previously dischargeable debt 
will become presumptively nondischargeable. 
 116. See Whitford, supra note 44. 
 117. See MANN, supra note 16, chs. 4–5. 
 118. See id. chs. 12–14. 
 119. See id. ch. 11. 
MANN.DOC 12/15/2006  4:03:45 PM 
No. 1] THE “SWEAT BOX” OF CREDIT CARD DEBT 403 
sponses focus on the payment functionality.  Because credit cards might 
encourage consumers to spend too much, and perhaps more than they 
can repay out of monthly incomes, credit card use can lead to unplanned 
debt.  The best responses to this problem shift routine payment transac-
tions to debit cards and include such things as point-of-sale disclosures 
and limitations on advertising, credit card surcharges, and limitations on 
teaser rates and affinity and rewards programs.120 
Other responses focus on the credit function.  Because the credit 
card is so easy to use (that is, the transaction costs of credit card lending 
are so low), borrowers underestimate the risks associated with future 
revenue streams.  The response is to intervene in the market for con-
sumer lending or adjust the types of relief available in bankruptcy.121  Al-
though policymakers around the world are loosening the rigor of their 
consumer bankruptcy systems—in large part due to the introduction of 
American-style consumer credit—the legislative desire to protect the 
credit card’s unique place in the U.S. economy was one of the most im-
portant motivations for the bankruptcy reform statute.  Oddly enough, 
the credit card industry successfully convinced bipartisan majorities in 
both the House and Senate that there were serious deficiencies in the 
American bankruptcy system within which the card has had its phe-
nomenal success.  Thus, the central idea behind the “fresh start”—the 
complete liquidation of all debts—has shifted towards a presumption in 
favor of repayment. 
Given the difficulties of sorting out the various factors that influ-
ence consumer bankruptcy filings, even hindsight is unlikely to give us a 
confident understanding of the effects of the Act on bankruptcy filings.  
For example, I doubt that the Act will deter borrowing to any significant 
extent.  I am also skeptical that it will reduce the number of bankruptcies 
in any substantial way.  Moreover, I think it most improbable that con-
sumers will see the benefit of any increased bankruptcy payouts in the 
form of interest rate reductions.  Still, these assumptions will be hard to 
test with quantitative data alone, especially in the early years of the Act’s 
operation.  Thus, in the end, I expect that an informed sense of the actual 
impact of the Act will come only after years of experience.  For now, I 
can offer just the speculations on which this essay is based. 
 
 120. See id. chs. 13–14. 
 121. See id. chs. 15–17. 
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